Walid Phares über jihadistische Ideologen, die “lone wolves” produzieren

Professor Walid Phares hat ein Interview für FoxNews gegeben, in dem er aktuelle Probleme bei der Terrorismusbekämpfung angibt, die daraus resultieren, weil die Nachrichtendienste nicht die Ideologie des Jihadismus berücksichtigt haben. Hier ein kurzer Ausschnitt aus dem Interview:

Fox: The heads of US national security agencies testified this week that al Qaeda is planning on more attacks against US homeland this year and we expect attempts within six months. Why did they make that assessment?

Walid Phares: The main basis for this assessment are the events of last year. There were twelve terror attempts, two were bloody in Arkansas and Ft Hood, and a third could have been a disaster. But such assessment is still a reactive mode. We know there will be attacks, but the Government isn’t able to identify the threat so far.

Fox: “Why are we not able to identify the threat, the cells, and the means they will use? Haven’t we learn enough in 8 years?”

Walid Phares: It is a policy problem. Our analysts and agencies are denied to act on ideology, they can only act on the basis of a crime committed as in the cases of Abdelmutalib, Nidal Hasan, and others.

Fox: “Officials admitted the lone wolves are the main threat, Is this the terrorism of the future that we will have to face in America: individuals who decide to become terrorists on their own?”

Walid Phares: Yes, we will be facing more and more with homegrown lone wolves but they aren’t so alone. They are produced by a machinery, thus they aren’t so isolated.

Fox: “Recently we’ve been seeing that these radical jihadists like Abdelmutalib and Hasan are linked to radical clerics such as Imam Awlaki, now hiding in Yemen. And now we discover that Yasir Qadhi, another American born Islamic scholar had links to Abdelmutalib. What does that mean?”

Walid Phares: It means that the radicalization is happening inside the United States. It is a result of radical ideologues impactign the minds of indoctrinated individuals

Fox: “Isn’t the US Government aware of it?”

Walid Phares: Actually the bureaucracies have been fooled by many Jihadists who have been posing as cultural advisors and have been penetrating our system.

Hier ist der Link zum Interview auf FoxNews:

http://video.foxnews.com/v/4006719/lone-wolf-terror-threat/?playlist_id=87249

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab arbeitet für das FBI

Nach dem gescheiterten Terror-Anschlag in Detroit im Dezember 2009 kooperiert der Attentäter Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab angeblich mit den US-Ermittlern des FBI. So heißt es in der NZZ, dass der Nigerianer seit der vergangenen Woche wertvolle vertrauliche Informationen geliefert habe, die nähere Einzelheiten über die Al-Qaida im Jemen ergeben hätten. Laut der Nachrichtenagentur AP brachten FBI-Agenten die Familie des Attentäters dazu, ihren Sohn gut zuzureden, um mit den US-Ermittlern zusammenzuarbeiten.

Interessante Artikel zum Thema führerloser Jihad

In den letzten Wochen sind einige interessante Kommentare von Jihadismus- oder Terrorismus-Experten in den Zeitungen erschienen, die zu den Anschlägen bzw. Anschlagsversuchen der letzten Monate in den USA Stellung nehmen. Dabei kommen die unterschiedlichsten Sichtweise zum Vorschein.
Olivier Roy scheibt, dass dieser Jihad kein Phänomen des Nahen Ostens ist, sondern sich im Westen entwickelt hat. Die Radikalisierung dieser Jugendlichen, die die Terroranschläge umsetzen wollten, fand im Westen statt.
Siehe hier: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/opinion/11iht-edroy.html
Paul Waldman schreibt, dass die Anschlagsversuche zeigen, dass die Al-Qaida zerfällt. Sie sind nicht mehr in der Lage, Anschläge effizient umzusetzen.
Siehe hier: http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=scareplane
Im Newsweek erschien ein Artikel, der den führerlosen Jihad als ein Phänomen ansieht, dass in Zukunft das wesentliche Element des jihadistischen Terrors sein wird und vermehrt im Westen auftreten wird.
Siehe hier: http://www.newsweek.com/id/229078

Der beste Artikel zum Thema führerloser Jihad kommt von Raffaello Pantucci, der sich schon mehrere Jahre mit Phänomen des homegrown terrorism beschäftigt. Er erläutert, dass der jihadistische Terrorismus immer mehr von “lone wolfs” betrieben wird, die Inspirationen von der Al-Qaida und anderen jihadistischen Gruppierung aus dem Internet erhalten.

Siehe hier: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/04/terrorism-al-qaida-detroit-attack

Artikel über Online-Jihadismus

In der Januar-Ausgabe des Bundeswehr-Magazins Y ist ein Artikel zum Thema Medienkrieg zwischen Jihadisten und den Nachrichtendiensten von mir veröffentlicht worden. Der Titel lautet: CIA fischt im Dschihad-Web; Islamistische Extremisten nutzen das Internet, um ihre Ideologie zu verbreiten, Kämpfer zu gewinnen, Anleitungen zu geben. Westliche Geheimdienste kämpfen dagegen.
Der Artikel ist nicht online erhältlich; nur in der Printausgabe vom Januar (S.23).
Weitere Infos unter: http://www.y-punkt.de/portal/a/ypunkt

Abu Musab al-Suris Theorie? – Nidal Hasans individueller Jihad in der Praxis?

Hier ein kurzer Textauszug aus einem jihadistischen Webforum:

Shaikh Abu Musab Al Suri (May Allah Free Him Soon) once wrote,

“I believe that a new generation of Jihadists is born today in the post 9/11 climate, where Iraq is occupied and the Palestinian uprising has reached a climax, thus leaving it at a crossroads. We are at a juncture where the believers have exhausted all their resources, and the nation stands by as a spectator in relation to their sacrifices because of the compelling silence of the ulama, the oppression of its rulers, and the inability to retaliate.”

Shaikh Abu Musab Al Suri proposed that the next stage of jihad will be characterized by terror operations created by individuals or small autonomous groups (what he terms `leaderless resistance’) which will wear down the enemy and prepare the ground for the far ambitious aim of waging war on `open fronts’ …. `without confrontation in the field and seizing control of the land, we cannot establish a state, which is the strategic goal of the resistance.’

Al Suri wrote a book called The Global Islamic Resistance Call in which all details, necessity and implementation of above mentioned theory is given.

Now case of Maj. Hasan is an excellent example of “individual jihad” and it bears all the characteristics of a successful operation.

* There was element of surprise in this attack.
* Chosen location for the attack couldn’t be better as Fort Hood is one of the largest United States military installations in the world and the only two-division post in the United States.
* This will cause Kafirs to show enmity against Muslims living in the west particularly in United States, thus objective of “widening the gap” between Muslims and Kafirs shall be attained.
* Muslims will be discouraged to join Kafir Armies around the globe.
* Kafir armies in general and United States Army in particular will spend more money to secure their basis to prevent an future incidents. This will result in draining of their resources.
* This operation by brother Hasan will cause Kafir Armies to spend their resources to carry on surveillance and appropriate intelligence activity to monitor Muslims in and around the forces.
* This operation has caused fear of “Islamic Cell” in the heart of Kafirs as press reports suggest. They are worried there might be more involved in this attack.

So it is an ideal example of how Jihad operations should be conducted these days at individual level.

Neue Debatte über jihadistische Propaganda im Internet

Es entsteht gerade ein neue Debatte zur Problematik, dass Jihadisten Propaganda im Internet betreiben. John Arquilla kritisiert die Sicherheitsbehörden, weil diese nichts gegen den jihadistischen Medienkrieg im Internet betreiben würden. So behauptet er in seinem Artikel im Foreign Policy, dass
more than eight years after 9/11, terrorist networks are still not only able to stay in touch via cyberspace, but that they are even extending their reach thanks to our giving them a free ride in the virtual domain.
Tim Stevens, Betreiber des Blogs Ubiwar, sieht dies allerdings in einem Artikel in der Washington Post anders. Er behauptet, dass Arquillas Äußerungen falsch seien und
his statements also ignore the success the US and its allies have had in using the internet to track and trace suspects, although it would be disingenuous to suggest that they are as effective as they might be.

Beide Artikel können Sie unter folgenden Links lesen:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/11/how_to_lose_a_cyberwar

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/14/internet-extremism-jihadi-youtube

In den nächsten Tagen wird sich wahrscheinlich aus den Kommentaren der beiden Experten eine neue Debatte zum Thema Online-Jihad entwickeln.

Erste Rezension

Armin Pfahl-Traughber, Politikwissenschaftler und Professor an der Fachhochschule des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung (FH Bund) in Brühl/Rheinland, hat im humanistischen Pressedienst eine Rezension zu meinem Buch „Kontinuität und Wandel in der Ideologie des Jihadi-Salafismus. Eine ideentheoretische Analyse der Schriften von Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi und Abu Bakr Naji“ veröffentlicht.

Ideologien des Islamismus

Der junge Politikwissenschaftler Dirk Baehr geht in seinem Buch „Kontinuität und Wandel in der Ideologie des Jihadi-Salafismus. Eine ideentheoretische Analyse der Schriften von Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi und Abu Bakr Naji“ auf neue Ideologie- und Strategieansätze im Umfeld des islamistischen Terrorismus ein.

Da diese neueren Vordenker zwar von Attentätern offenbar näher wahrgenommen wurden, aber im Westen noch keine größere Aufmerksamkeit fanden, verdient der Band aufgrund seines hohen Informationsgehalts Aufmerksamkeit.

Nach islamistischen Anschlägen fanden die Fahnder nicht selten in den Wohnungen der Terroristen Schriften von Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi oder Abu Bakr Naji. Während klassische Ideologen des Islamismus wie Sayyid Qutb mittlerweile auch bei Interessierten in den westlichen Ländern bekannt sind, gilt dies weniger für die neueren Strategen und Vordenker des gewaltgeneigten Teils dieser politischen Bestrebungen. Dies hat den Politikwissenschaftler Dirk Baehr dazu motiviert, „die Wurzeln sowie den Wandel des Jihadi-Salafismus anhand der Schriften von führenden Ideologen“ (S. 11) darzustellen. Unter „Salafismus“ versteht er eine Sammelbezeichnung für die Anhänger einer Position, der es um eine Rückkehr zur Gesellschaftsordnung zur Zeit des Propheten Mohammed geht. „Jihadi-Salafismus“ meint als Teilbereich des „Salafismus“ jene Tendenzen, welche diesen Weg nicht nur mit politischen, sondern auch mit terroristischen Mitteln gehen wollen. Demnach steht bei Baehr der Begriff „Jihadi-Salafismus“ für den „Jihadismus“.

Weiterlesen unter http://hpd.de/node/8365

Vielen Dank an Herrn Pfahl-Traughber

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol. 9

Zwei neue Aufsätze von Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Beide Aufsätze scheinen diesmal wieder interessanter zu sein. Insbesondere der Aufsatz von Thomas Hegghammer hört sich vielversprechend an!

The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups
There is broad consensus in the analytical literature on Islamism on the need to disaggregate the various sub-currents of Islamist ideology. And while there is considerable disagreement among observers about what constitutes the right typology for differentiating between these sub-currents, there is general agreement on a handful of key analytical distinctions. Of these, perhaps the most common is the so-called “near enemy-far enemy” divide, which is often used to distinguish between groups that target primarily local Muslim regimes, and groups that focus on Western targets.[1]

And yet, as anyone who has followed militant Islamism closely in recent years will testify, the distinction between near enemy and far enemy groups seems less and less relevant. Many jihadist groups are displaying ambiguous rhetoric and behavior with regard to who they consider as their main enemy. In the past five years, “far enemy groups” such as al-Qaeda Central[2] have adopted a more hostile and explicitly takfiri rhetoric toward Muslim regimes. Conversely, “near enemy” activists such as the militants in Algeria have become more anti-Western in both words and deeds. A process of ideological hybridization has occurred, with the result that the enemy hierarchies of many jihadist groups are becoming more unclear or heterogeneous than they used to be.[3]

Why is this process of ideological hybridization occurring? The central argument of this paper is that this hybridization is a result of strain and a sign of weakness. When enemy hierarchies become unclear, undefined, or heterogeneous, then this is most often a sign of increasing radicalization and political isolation. Groups often adopt ambiguous enemy hierarchies because they are experiencing recruitment problems; by addressing a wider range of grievances they hope to widen their prospective recruitment base. Groups can also afford to have more enemies because they have fewer allies. For the jihadists, there are short-term advantages to having unclear enemy hierarchies, but the long-term liabilities are probably more serious.

Ideal Typologies

The term “hybrid” presupposes the existence of discrete ideal types. When we speak of ideological hybridization, we are assuming there was a time when ideologies were not hybridized. What were these ideal type ideologies? More importantly, did they ever exist in “pure” form?

Let us start by clarifying what we mean by “ideology” in this context. The term ideology has been used to describe belief-systems of very different sizes, from broad intellectual traditions to specific doctrines. In this article, ideology is defined narrowly as a set of principles that guides the political behavior of a subset of militant Islamist groups. A shorter term would be “rationale for Islamist violence.”

Implicit in this ad-hoc definition is the observation that militant Islamists fight for different things and in different ways. Islamist groups may share a number of long-term aims and political inclinations, but they differ in their short-term and mid-term priorities. This is a view shared by the vast majority of scholars since the early 1980s, when people realized that monolithic notions of Islamism did not help understand the ever more varied patterns of Islamist behavior observed on the ground. Islamism needed to be disaggregated; the question was how. Over the years, scholars have proposed a wide range of typologies to capture the differences between Islamist groups, without reaching a consensus. Broadly speaking there are two different approaches to disaggregating radical Islamism. The first looks for differences in theological orientation, the second for differences in political preferences.

 

Weiterlesen hier.

“Kontinuität und Wandel in der Ideologie des Jihadi-Salafismus” online erhältlich

Nun ist mein Buch “Kontinuität und Wandel in der Ideologie des Jihadi-Salafismus – Eine ideentheoretische Analyse der Schriften von Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi und Abu Bakr Naji” nach Verzögerungen doch online bei amazon.de, libri.de oder weltbild.de erhältlich!

“Homegrown Terrorism” am Beispiel Christian Ganczarski

Im Militant Islam Monitor gibt es einen älteren Beitrag von 2007 zum Thema “homegrown terrorism” in Deutschland. Als gutes Beispiel für eine “homegrown” Radikalisierung wird der Fall von Christian Ganczarski, der in Frankreich Anfang 2009 zu 18 Jahren Haft verurteilt wurde, analysiert.

Homegrown terrorism in Germany: The case of Christian Ganczarski

By Emerson Vermaat
October 8, 2007

Osama bin Laden called him his “German general,” to other high level Al-Qaeda operatives he was known as “Ibrahim the German or “Abu Ibrahim.” Christian Manfred Ganczarski, a Muslim convert from Germany, was one of bin Laden’s personal couriers who had direct access to Al-Qaeda’s top leadership. He passed messages from Khaled Sheikh Mohammed on to Osama bin Laden or visa versa. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) or “brother Mukhtar” was the high level Al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan who planned the 9/11 operation.

It was in April 2000 that Ganczarski gave a handwritten letter from brother Mukhtar to Osama bin Laden. The letter introduced and recommended an Australian convert named Jack Roche who had traveled with Ganczarski from Karachi, Pakistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Jack Roche was to set up a terror cell in Sydney, Australia, with a view to planning terrorist attacks. But first, Mr. Roche needed to be trained in the use of explosives in one of Al-Qaeda’s training camps. Bin Laden was friendly. The Al-Qaeda leader liked converts from Western countries and invited Christian en Jack to share a meal with him.[1 On his return to Australia in June 2000, Jack Roche or “Jihad Jack” planned to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Canberra. He was arrested in November 2002 and sentenced to nine years in June 2004.

Roche converted to Islam in 1992, and later met an operative from Jemaah Islamiya in a Sydney mosque. Jemaah Islamiya was Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian branch. An Indonesian man named Encep Nurjaman or “Hambali” was the operations chief of Jemaah Islamiya. Hambali closely cooperated with Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and he was also involved in the preparations of 9/11.[2

When he met bin Laden in Kandahar in the Spring of 2000, Jack Roche hoped that Al-Qaeda would ask him to join to Taliban to fight in their ranks. Al-Qaeda had other plans for him. They wanted him to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Canberra and kill a Jewish businessman.[3

Recruited in the radical Al-Taqwa Mosque in Duisburg

Christian Ganczarski himself was also recruited after visiting a radical mosque in Germany. The inconspicuous Al-Taqwa Mosque in Duisburg was a meeting point for radical Islamists.[4

Ganczarski was born in Gliwice, Poland, in October 1966. His devout Catholic parents were of German origin. The family moved to Germany in 1976. They settled in Müllheim in the industrial Ruhr valley region. As a teenager he lost his faith in the Catholic Church and got involved in petty crime. He found a job in the firm of Düwag in Krefelt where he met so-called “guest workers” from Muslim countries. One of his friends was a Tunisian who encouraged him to read the Koran. It was in the Summer of 1986 that Ganczarski became a Muslim himself saying the “shahada” (Muslim confession) in a mosque. He was also circumcised and became active in a local Müllheim mosque. The 19-year old Muslim convert adopted the name of “Ibrahim.” He married another Muslim convert, Nicola (“Maymuna”). They had a daughter who suffered from diabetes. People in Mülheim told me they still remember the Ganczarskis: he had a heavy beard, was dressed like a Pakistani and his wife wore a niqab.

With the help of the Saudi gynaecologist Dr. Nadeem Elyas from the Bilal Mosque in Aachen, Ganczarski received permission to study in Saudi Arabia in 1992. The Saudi royal family had asked Dr. Elyas to target German converts with a view to winning them over to “Wahhabism,” the arch-conservative Saudi branch of Islam. (This was also done in other European countries.) Elyas had first contacted Ganczarski’s imam in Müllheim asking him if he knew suitable candidates. The imam knew a good candidate and mentioned the name of Christian Ganczarski. The Saudi doctor was well connected: he also played a leading role in the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD), the Central Council of Muslims in Germany. Consequently, he was in a unique position to contact mosques and imams. Money was no problem. So Ganczarski’s wife and daughter were able to join him one year later.

Due to insufficient knowledge of the Arab language Christian “Ibrahim” Ganczarski was unable to finish his studies. He returned to Germany in 1994 to live in the city of Duisburg. In the Al-Taqwa Mosque he met Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a Mauritanian who had just graduated from the local Gerhard-Mercator University with a degree in electronic engineering. Ould Slahi came to Germany in 1988. He became a student in Duisburg and through the internet he came into contact with radical Chechen groups. He joined the jihad in Bosnia.[5He traveled to Aghanistan twice and received training from Al-Qaeda. His brother-in-law was Al-Qaeda financier Khaled Al-Shanquiti, also known as “Abu Hafs the Mauritanian.” Al-Shanquiti was very close to Osama bin Laden. The 9/11 Commission Report refers to Ould Slahi as “a significant Al-Qaeda operative.”[6 After graduation he set up an import and export firm in Duisburg (“Ould Slahi GmbH”) which served as a cover for Al-Qaeda activities. He also claimed social security benefits to which he was not entitled at all. Huge sums of Al-Qaeda money were transferred through the account of his firm. Much of the money came from his brother-in-law Al-Shanquiti in Sudan who was involved in the preparations of the Al-Qaeda suicide bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

In Duisburg, Ould Slahi (“Abu Musab”) successfully recruited Christian Ganczarski and Karim Mehdi, a young and fanatical Moroccan. They often met in the Al-Taqwa Mosque in Duisburg and in another mosque in Müllheim.

Ould Slahi was in touch with Marwan Al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah and Ramzi Binalshibh, three key members of the Hamburg 9/11 terror cell led by Mohammed Atta. He met them twice in his Duisburg apartment and advised them to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan. After his arrest in 2002, Binalshibh was interrogated by U.S. intelligence officials.

“Binalshibh said they were initially suspicious of Abu Musab, but came to trust him as the meeting progressed. Abu Musab told them that the first step was to get Pakistani visas, as Pakistan would serve as their point of entry for onward travel to Afghanistan. He instructed them to apply for the visas using their authentic passports and to return in a specific period of time. Binalshibh was unsure how much time passed between the first and second meetings, but estimated it was approximately two or three weeks.

Binalshibh said that, although Mohammed Atta (the lead hijacker) did not attend the meetings, he also decided to go to Afghanistan.”[7

Mohammed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah and Ramzi Binalshibh became core members of the 9/11 plot – with Atta designed as its operational leader.[8 All of them met with Osama bin Laden and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda’s operational leader. It was during these meetings that the 9/11 plot began to take shape. The idea to use hijacked planes as bombs originated in the mind of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and bin Laden approved his proposal in April 1999. Within Al-Qaeda the plot was now referred to as the “planes operation.”[9 There are no indications that Mohamedou Ould Slahi knew about the plot or recruited Binalshibh, Jarrah, Atta and Al-Shehhi into Al-Qaeda. This was done later after they arrived in Afghanistan at the end of 1999. But without Ould Slahi’s advice the three 9/11 suicide pilots from Hamburg would never have considered going to Afghanistan. They originally planned to go to Chechnya. Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri were agreeably suprised when they met these promising new recruits. They were the perfect candidates for the 9/11 suicide mission.

weiterlesen unter: http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/3204